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I. THE COMMONWEALTH CARIBBEAN

The term "the Commonwealth Caribbean" describes that group of countries bounded by the Caribbean Sea, from the Bahamas in the north to Guyana in the south, including a sole Central American outpost in Belize in the
west, which are bounded by the Caribbean Sea, and all of which were, at
some point in their rich and colourful history, colonies of Great Britain.1 In
this regard, they all share with the United States some aspects of a common
history, such as a common language.2 With the exceptions of Belize and
Guyana, which are geographically parts of the continents of Central and
South America, they are all island countries whose names are well known

1. Dennis M. Hanratty, Introduction to ISLANDS OF THE COMMONWEALTH CARIBBEAN:
A REGIONAL STUDY, at xix (Sandra W. Meditz & Dennis M. Hanratty eds., 1989). The full list
of the independent countries is as follows: Anguilla, Antigua and Barbuda, the British Virgin
Islands, Barbados, Belize, the Cayman Islands, Dominica, Grenada, Guyana, Jamaica, Montserrat, St. Christopher and Nevis, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, the Bahamas,
Trinidad and Tobago, and Turks and Caicos. Id.
2. Franklin W. Knight, Regional Overview, in ISLANDS OF THE COMMONWEALTH
CARIBBEAN: A REGIONAL STUDY, supra note 1, at 41.
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throughout the world for the exploits of their nationals in the arts, culture,
sports, and for their reputation for physical beauty and an incredibly hospitable climate. 3
Prior to these territories gaining independence from the United Kingdom, the apex of their judicial and legal system was the Judicial Committee
of the Privy Council, which was an English institution that had been established by the Judicial Committee Act 1833. 4 The Privy Council accordingly
functioned as the final court of appeal for all of the colonies of Britain (including, at various stages of their history: Canada, Australia, New Zealand,
Hong Kong, and much of Africa) and, by that role, provided a unifying force
in the common law of England as it applied in the colonies.5
The independence movement in the Commonwealth Caribbean began in
the early 1960s (with Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago being the forerunners in 1962) and continued well into the 1980s. 6 By the end of the independent movement, there remained in the region only five dependencies of
the United Kingdom. 7 Upon achieving independence, each of the former
colonies had a choice "of either allowing appeals to an external court to continue or of abolishing them." 8 All of them, in fact, opted to preserve appeals
to the Privy Council (an external court) and, with the single exception of
Guyana, 9 this has remained the situation up until quite recently. 10 In an as3. Id. at 5, 41.
4. ROSE-MARIE BELLE ANTOINE, COMMONWEALTH CARIBBEAN LAW AND LEGAL
SYSTEMS 230 (1999); SIR FRED PHILLIPS, COMMONWEALTH CARIBBEAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

3 (2002).
See ANTOINE, supra note 4, at 230.
See Rex A. Hudson & Daniel J. Seyler, Jamaica, in ISLANDS OF THE COMMONWEALTH
CARIBBEAN: A REGIONAL STUDY, supra note 1, at 55; Beatrice Berle Meyerson et al, Trinidad
and Tobago, in ISLANDS OF THE COMMONWEALTH CARIBBEAN: A REGIONAL STUDY, supra
note 1, at 165.
7. See
Foreign
& Commonwealth
Office,
UK Overseas
Territories,
http://www.fco.gov.uk (follow "UK Priorities" hyperlink; then follow "UK Overseas Territories" hyperlink) (last visited Mar. 20, 2006). Those remaining dependencies include: Anguilla, British Virgin Islands, Cayman Islands, Montserrat, and Turk and Caicos Islands. See
id.
8. Sir Roy Marshall, The Response of the Law to the Challenge of Independence: A
Review of the Past and an Agenda for the Future, with ParticularReference to Barbados, in
COMMONWEALTH CARIBBEAN LEGAL STUDIES 4 (Gilbert Kodilinye & P. K. Menon eds.,
1992); See ISLANDS OF THE COMMONWEALTH CARIBBEAN: A REGIONAL STUDY, supra note 1,
passim.
9. See Parliament of Guyana, Acts Passed by the National Assembly for the Year 1970,
http://www.sdnp.org.gy/parliament/actslist.pdf. Appeals to the Privy Council were abolished
in Guyana. Id.
10. See ISLANDS OF THE COMMONWEALTH CARIBBEAN: A REGIONAL STUDY, supra note 1,
passim.
5.
6.
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sertion of their independence in, as some have argued, "an exercise of sovereignty, not a derogation from it,"" the territories of the Commonwealth
Car12
ibbean chose to retain the Privy Council as their final court of appeal.
However, this state of affairs has not enjoyed complete approbation
from significant parts of the body of informed opinion throughout the region,
and as one distinguished Caribbean jurist observed, "'it is offensive to the
sovereignty of independent nations and therefore, politically unacceptable, to
have a foreign tribunal permanently entrenched in their [Clonstitutions as
their final court.', 13 The arguments for and against are lucidly expounded by
Professor Simeon McIntosh, the distinguished current Dean of the Faculty of
Law of the University of the West Indies, in the concluding chapter, "Reading Text and Polity: The Case for a Caribbean Supreme Court," of his seminal work on constitutional reform in the Commonwealth Caribbean. 4 Many
in the region would find it difficult to question his conclusion that "the continuing presence of the . . . Judicial Committee in the post-independence
Commonwealth Caribbean political order represents a vestigial incongruity,
a contradiction in the constitutional symbolism of a politically independent
sovereign order."' 15 This therefore provides the historical and theoretical
background against which some of the governments in the region have entered into the international "Agreement Establishing the Caribbean Court of
Justice, signed at Bridgetown, Barbados, on the 14th day of February,
2001 .16 The recent successful challenge in Jamaica to the constitutionality
of local legislation designed to give effect to the Agreement and the Protocol
demonstrates that, despite the inauguration of the Caribbean Court of Justice
on April 16, 2005, the governments and the people of the region may yet be
some distance away from the complete achievement of abolition of appeals
to the Privy Council and the removal of what the Chief Justice of Barbados
11.

See Marshall, supra note 8, at 4.

12.

See ISLANDS OF THE COMMONWEALTH CARIBBEAN: A REGIONAL STUDY, supra note 1,

passim.

13.

Hugh A. Rawlins, The Privy Council or a Caribbean Final Court of Appeal?, 6

CARIB. L. REv. 235, 251 (1996) (alteration in original) (quoting Sir Isaac Hyatali, Towards a
West Indian Jurisprudence 9 (1987) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the University of
the West Indies, Law Library Reserve Collection)).
14.

SIMEON C.R. MCINTOSH, CARIBBEAN CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM:

RETHINKING THE

WEST INDIAN POLrrY 264-342 (2002).
15. Id. at 265.
16. See Caribbean Court of Justice Bill, part I, Feb. 14, 2001, 43 Trin. & Tobago Gazette
155, available at http://www.ttparliament.orgbillslhouse/2004/b2O04h22.pdf. In July 2003,
this agreement was amended by a protocol signed in Montego Bay, Jamaica. See Protocol to
the Agreement Establishing the Caribbean Court of Justice Relating to the Juridical Personal-

ity
and
Legal
Capacity
of
http://www.caricomlaw.org/doc-dl.php?id=556.
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has described
as "an affront to sovereignty ... inconsistent with independ17
ence."'
But this article's main area of focus is not so much on the merits, or otherwise, of abolishing appeals to the Privy Council and the establishment of a
Caribbean Court of Justice in its place; for despite the constitutional challenges, the actual setting up of the Court and the appointment of judges, both
of which have now taken place, must surely set the stage for the kind of creative, but purposive, dialogue between the governments and the people of the
region that will be required to secure a basis for consensus on its viability in
the long run. Rather, my concern is to highlight the role of the Privy Council, as a final court of appeal for the region, in an area of critical importance
to the every day life of all citizens of the region, that is, capital punishment.
An analysis of that role will establish, I contend, that the Privy Council has
demonstrated tremendous flexibility in response to changing norms in the
area of international human rights, and it has done so in a manner that underscores the absolute desirability of an independent, responsible, and responsive final court of appeal. Far from being an argument in favor of preserving
indefinitely, or for a time, appeals to the Privy Council, this is intended,
rather, to provide a signpost to the quality of thought and adjudication that
the citizenry must be entitled to expect, and to demand, from its higher judiciary, whether its seat is to be found in London, or in Port of Spain.
II.

THE DEATH PENALTY

In the case of Boyce v. The Queen,18 an appeal from Barbados, Lord
Hoffman (delivering the majority judgment), described the mandatory death
penalty in this way:
Since the island of Barbados was colonised by the English in the
seventeenth century, death has been the mandatory sentence for the crime
of murder. That was the common law of England and it became the law of
Barbados. In the nineteenth century it was codified in English statutes
dealing with offences against the person: see section 3 of the Offences
Against the Person Act 1828 and section 1 of the Offences Against the Person Act 1861. Each of these statutes was followed a few years later by a
17. Honorable Sir David Simmons, The Caribbean Court of Justice: A Unique Institution of Caribbean Creativity, 29 NOVA L. REv. 171, 173, 182 (2005). See also Press Release,
CARICOM, Caribbean Court of Justice Is Inaugurated
(Apr. 16, 2005),
http://www.caricom.org/jsp/pressreleases/pres82-05.htm (indicating exact date of the inauguration). For the Jamaican constitutional challenge, see Independent Jamaica Council for
Human Rights (1998) Ltd. v. Marshal-Burnett,[2005] UKPC 3 (appeal taken from Jam.),
availableat http://www.privy-council.org.uk/files/other/independent%20jamaica.jud.rtf.
18. [2004] UKPC 32, [2005] 1 A.C. 400 (appeal taken from Barb.).
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similar statute in Barbados. Section 2 of the Barbados Offences Against
the Person Act 1868 provided, as section 1 of the English Act of 1861 had
done, "whosoever shall be convicted of murder shall suffer death as a
felon."
In the United Kingdom the death penalty was confined by Part II of
the Homicide Act 1957 to certain kinds of murder which the Act designated "capital". The Murder (Abolition of Death Penalty) Act 1965 abolished altogether its imposition for murder and section 1 of the Offences
Against the Person Act 1861 was repealed. But no similar legislation was
enacted in Barbados and the old law remained in force when Barbados became independent on 30 November 1966. Since then, section 2 of the
1868 Act has been replaced by section 2 of the Offences Against the Person Act 1994: 19"Any person convicted of murder shall be sentenced to, and
suffer, death."

Apart from minor differences in wording (in Belize, for instance, the
20
law states that "[e]very person who commits murder shall suffer death"),
the Barbados provision is typical of that to be found in the Commonwealth
Caribbean. 2' However, the movement internationally towards the abolition
of the death penalty by statutory intervention has not borne fruit in the region
(save, of course, in the remaining British dependent territories, where the
United Kingdom reforms described by Lord Hoffman have applied as a matter of course). 22 Despite a strong and sustained human rights campaign, particularly in Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago, in favour of abolition of the
death penalty, I think it is fair to say that this result remains a remote possibility. The fact is that the rate of violent crime, particularly murder, in these
small countries continues to be such (and it is on the increase) that abolition
of the death penalty at this time is unlikely to attract the level of public support that governments will probably want to look to in order to promote such
a radical change in the status quo.23 So the death penalty remains, and is
likely to remain for some time, the penalty for murder throughout the region.
However, there have been legislative attempts, notably in Jamaica and Be-

19. Boyce [2004] UKPC 32 I 8-9 (citation omitted).
20. Criminal
Code,
2003, c.
101,
§
106(1)
http://www.belizelaw.org/lawadmin/index2.htmil.
21. See Boyce [2004] UKPC 32 in 52, 62, 69.

(Belize),

available

at

22. See id.
23. Take the case of Jamaica: In 2004 there were 1471 murders, and as of September 29,
2005, the total was already in excess of 1260 (out of a total population of approximately 2.5
million). Earl Moxam, Crime Stifling Ja's Progress: UN Envoy, JAM. GLEANER, Oct. 2, 2005,
http://www.jamaica-gleaner.com/gleaner/20051OO2/lead/lead6.html (last visited Mar. 20,
2006).
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lize, to mitigate its application by providing for degrees of murder, with only
the most serious ("capital") cases attracting the sentence of death.2 4
III.

THE INTERNATIONAL BILL OF RIGHTS AND THE
COMMONWEALTH CARIBBEAN

What has come to be known as the International Bill of Rights comprises the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 25 the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, 6 the International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights, 27 and the Optional Protocols to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. 28 To these may be added the
American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man,2 9 which is similar in
its terms to the Universal Declaration,30 and the American Convention on
Human Rights (1979),3 1 both of which are products of the Organization of
American States system, 32 of which many countries of the region are members.3 3

The right to life is a centrally enshrined feature of many international
instruments. "Every person has the right to life, liberty and the security of

24. See Offences Against the Person Act, 1992, § 3 (Jam.), available at
http://www.moj.gov.jm/?q=law/view/327; Criminal Code, 2003, c. 101, §§ 106-108 (Belize).
25. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A (III), U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess.,
U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948), available at http://www.un.org/documents/ga/res/3/ares3.htm (follow "217 (II)" hyperlink).
26. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, G.A. Res. 2200(a)
(XXI), U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966), available at
http://www.un.org/documents/ga/res/2 l/ares21.htm (follow "2200 (XXI)" hyperlink).
27. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200(b) (XXI), U.N.
GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966), available at
http://www.un.org/documents/ga/res/2 l/ares21 .htm (follow "2200 (XXI)" hyperlink).
28. Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A.
Res. 2200(c) (XXI), U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966), available at http://www.un.org/documents/ga/res/21/ares2l.htm (follow "2200 (XXI)" hyperlink).
29. American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man, Res. XXX, approved by
Ninth International Conference of American States, 1948, reprinted in Basic Documents
Pertaining to Human Rights in the Inter-American System, OAS/Ser.LJV/I.4, rev. 9 (2003),
availableat, http://www.cidh.org/Basicos/basic2.htm.
30. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 25.
31. Organization of American States, American Convention on Human Rights, art. 4,
Nov. 22, 1969, O.A.S.T.S. No. 36, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123.
32. See Boyce v. The Queen [2004] UKPC 32 16, [2005] 1 A.C. 400 (appeal taken
from Barb.).
33. All thirty-five independent countries of the Americas are members of the Organization.
Member
States
and
Permanent
Missions,
http://www.oas.org/documents/eng/memberstates.asp (last visited Mar. 20, 2006).
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person," proclaims the Universal Declaration, 34 while the equivalent provision of the American Declaration is very similar.3 5 More detailed provisions
are to be found in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.36
Article six, paragraph one states, "[e]very human being has the inherent right
to life. This right shall be protected by law. No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his life." 37 Article seven states, "[n]o one shall be 3subject
to torture
8
or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.'
And the American Convention on Human Rights deals
with the death
39
penalty in even greater detail than the earlier instruments:
1. Every person has the right to have his life respected. This
right shall be protected by law... No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his life.
2. In countries that have not abolished the death penalty, it may
be imposed only for the most serious crimes ....

6. Every person condemned to death shall have the right to apply
for amnesty, pardon,4 or commutation of sentence, which may be
granted in all cases. 0
IV. THE INDEPENDENCE CONSTITUTIONS

By the time the Independence Constitutions came to be drafted in the
beginning of the 1960s, the basic outline of what was to become the International Bill of Rights had already began to take shape and all of the new Constitutions incorporated Bills of Rights patterned on the Universal Declaration
and the European Convention on Human Rights.4' As I have previously argued elsewhere, with reference to the case of Jamaica, "the international
provenance of the Bill of Rights has had the salutary effect of locating those

34. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 25, art. 3.
35. American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man, supra note 29, art. 1. "Every
human being has the right to life, liberty and the security of his person." Id.
36. See International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 27, art. 6.
37. Id.
38. Id. art. 7.
39. See Organization of American States, American Convention on Human Rights, supra
note 31.
40. Id.
41. See, e.g., THE JAMAICA (CONSTrrUTION) ORDER INCOUNCIL 1962 § 13.
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clauses within an international context. ' 4 2 The rights protected by section 13
of the Jamaican Constitution are a fair sample of what appears in the other
Constitutions and are as follows: "(a) life, liberty, security of the person, the
enjoyment of property and the protection of the law; (b) freedom of conscience, of expression and of peaceful
'43assembly and association; and (c) relife.
family
and
private
his
for
spect
The enshrinement of these rights in the Constitutions has "had the effect
of providing an authoritative, normative statement of the standards of con44
duct expected by the society of the state in its relationship with its citizens,"
and has also served to promote what Dr. Rose-Marie Belle Antoine has described as the "norm-building and evolutionary character of a constitution. 4 5
Their importance for the discussion which follows has to do mainly with the
extent to which it will be seen that they have prescribed norms of state behavior which have come over time, through the way in which they have been
interpreted, to mirror contemporary international standards.
V.

THE PRIVY COUNCIL AND THE DEATH PENALTY IN THE
COMMONWEALTH CARIBBEAN-THREE CASE STUDIES

It has tended to be a feature of supreme courts or courts of last resort in
common law systems that only a small selection of cases of significant and
general public importance are chosen for hearing and final adjudication.46 In
this way, the dockets of these courts are not overburdened, therefore allowing the judges the kind of space and time that is necessary to make meaningful contributions to the interpretation of existing rules of law and to the development of case law.47 One practical consequence of this is that decisions
of courts of last resort tend to endure and to be difficult to change even
where clearly justified by changed or changing circumstances.48 No less so
with the Privy Council, though the Privy Council has never been, in the strict
sense, bound by its own decisions. 49 Against this background, one highly
unusual feature of the decisions of the Privy Council on death penalty cases
from the Commonwealth Caribbean over the past twenty-five to thirty years
42.
(2004).
43.
44.
45.
46.
view, 5
47.
48.
49.

C.

DENNIS MORRISON, THE CITIZEN AND THE LAW:

PERSPECTIVES OLD AND NEW

3

THE JAMAICA (CONSTITUTION) ORDER IN COUNCIL 1962 § 13(a)-(c).
MORRISON,

supra note 42, at 3.

ANTOINE, supra note 4, at 81.

See Elisabetta Silvestri, Access to the Courts of Last Resort: A Comparative OverC.J.Q. 304, 305-06 (1986).
Id. at 305.
See id. at 304-20.
A.D. Burgess, JudicialPrecedent in the West Indies, W. INDIAN L.J. 27, 30 (1978).
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is that it has felt able to explicitly reverse its own previous decisions on at
least three occasions, a phenomenon which represents a recognition of the
ferment of changing norms in the arena of international human rights, and no
less of changing times.5 °
A. Case Study One: The Carrying Out of a Sentence of Death-The Impact of Delay
51

In Riley v. Attorney-General,

[tihe appellants were sentenced to death in Jamaica on various dates in 1975 and 1976 for murder. Their appeals to the Court
of Appeal were dismissed and petitions for leave to appeal to the
Privy Council were either dismissed or abandoned in 1976 and
1978. Between 1976 and 1979, however, there had been acute
controversy in Jamaica regarding capital punishment. During that
period, the execution of sentences of death was held in abeyance.
In 1979, the House of Representatives resolved that capital punishment should be retained. Warrants for the execution of the appellants were issued in the same year. They then sought declarations from the Supreme Court that their executions would be contrary to section 17(1) of the Constitution, as being "inhuman or
degrading punishment or other treatment" by reason of the length
and circumstances of the delay in each case between the passing of
the sentence and its execution. The Full Court refused the
declara52
tions and appeals to the Court of Appeal were dismissed.
On further appeal to the Privy Council, it was held by a bare majority
that the appeals should be dismissed as "whatever the reasons for or the
length of delay in executing a sentence of death lawfully imposed, the delay
can afford no
ground for holding the execution to be a contravention of sec5
tion 17(1).",

The Privy Council thus rejected the argument on behalf of the appellants that "long delay in the execution of a death sentence, especially delay
for which the condemned man is himself in no way responsible," 54 could
50. Maurice 0. Glinton, The Right to Life and PhysicalIntegrity of the Person (Torture
and Other Cruel or DegradingPunishment,Safeguards GuaranteeingProtectionof the Rights
of Those Facingthe Death Penalty), 15 W. INDIAN L.J. 45,50-51,53-54(1991).

51. [1983] 1 A.C. 719 (P.C.) (appeal taken from Jam.)
52. Riley v. A-G [1982] 35 W.I.R. 279, 279, [1983] 1 A.C. 719 (P.C.) (appeal taken from
Jam.) (quoting THE JAMAICA (CONsTrruTION) ORDER IN COUNCIL 1962 § 17(1)).
53.

Riley [1983] 1 A.C. at 726.

54. Id. at 725.
Published by NSUWorks, 2006
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constitute "'inhuman or degrading punishment or other treatment"' contrary
to section 17(1) of the Constitution. 5 In so doing, the majority of their Lordships were content to apply the reasoning of their own previous decision on
56
appeal from Trinidad and Tobago.
Ten years later, exactly the same question came before the Privy Council again in Pratt v. Attorney-General.57 "The appellants were convicted in
1979 of a murder committed in 1977 (since which [time] they had been detained in custody)," and were sentenced to death. 58 After various unsuccessful appellate proceedings, in 1991 they instituted proceedings for redress
under the Constitution of Jamaica "claiming that their continued detention
under sentence of death" for nearly fourteen years constituted "inhuman or
degrading punishment or other treatment" in contravention of section 17(1)
of the Constitution. 59 Not surprisingly, these proceedings were dismissed
and the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeal of Jamaica correctly6 held
themselves to be bound by the Privy Council's earlier decision in Riley. 0
But in a reversal of its own decision in Riley, the Privy Council in Pratt
ruled:
That the execution of the death sentence after unconscionable delay would constitute a contravention of section 17(1), except
where the delay had been the result of some fault of the accused,
e.g. an escape from custody or the frivolous or time-wasting resort
to legal procedures such as would amount to an abuse of process;
but delay attributable to the accused exploring
61 legitimate avenues
of appeal did not fall within such exception.
The Privy Council ruled further that "to execute the appellants after holding
them in custody and under sentence of death for nearly fourteen years would
be inhuman and in breach of section 17(1) and [that] their sentence[s] should
[accordingly] be commuted to life imprisonment. 62 The factual background

55. Id. at 726 (quoting THE JAMAICA (CONsTrruTION) ORDER INCOUNCIL 1962 § 17(1)).
56. Id. at 725-26 (citing de Freitas v. Benny [1976] A.C. 239 (P.C.) (appeal taken from
Trin. & Tobago)). In a powerful dissent which foreshadowed events to come, Lord Scarman
and Lord Brightman disagreed with the result. See id. at 727-36 (Scarman, L., & Brightman,
L., dissenting).
57. [1993] 43 W.I.R. 340, [1994] 2 A.C. 1 (P.C.) (appeal taken from Jam.).
58. Pratt [1993] 43 W.I.R. at 340.
59. Id. (quoting THE JAMAICA (CONSTrruTION) ORDER INCOUNCIL 1962 § 17(1)).
60. Id. at 355-56.
61. Id. at 341.
62. Id.
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and the context were stated briefly, but graphically, by Lord Griffiths as follows:
The appellants, Earl Pratt and Ivan Morgan, were arrested sixteen
years ago for a murder committed on 6th October 1977 and have
been held in custody ever since. On 15th January 1979 they were
convicted of murder and sentenced to death. Since that date they
have been in prison in that part of St. Catherine's prison set aside
to hold prisoners under sentence of death and commonly known as
"death row". On three occasions the death warrant has been read
to them and they have been removed to the condemned cells immediately adjacent to the gallows. The last occasion was in February 1991 for execution on 7th March; a stay was granted on 6th
March consequent upon the commencement of these proceedings.
The statement of these bare facts is sufficient to bring home to the
mind of any person of normal sensitivity and compassion the agony of mind that these men must have suffered as they have alternated between hope and despair in the fourteen years that they
have been in prison facing the gallows. It is unnecessary to refer
to the evidence describing the restrictive conditions of imprisonment and the emotional and psychological impact of this experience, for it only reveals that which it is to be expected. These men
are not alone in their suffering for there are now twenty-three prisoners in death row who have been awaiting execution for more
than ten years and eighty-two prisoners who have been awaiting
execution for more than five years. It is against this disturbing
background that their lordships must now determine this constitucorrectness of
tional appeal and must in particular reexamine the
63
the majority decision in Riley v. Attorney-General.
After a full review of the authorities, Lord Griffiths expressed the
unanimous conclusion of the seven member court in these terms:
In their lordships' view a State that wishes to retain capital
punishment must accept the responsibility of ensuring that execution follows as swiftly as practicable after sentence, allowing a
reasonable time for appeal and consideration of reprieve. It is part
of the human condition that a condemned man will take every opportunity to save his life through use of the appellate procedure. If
the appellate procedure enables the prisoner to prolong the appellate hearings over a period of years, the fault is to be attributed to
the appellate system that permits such delay and not to the prisoner
63. Pratt [1993] 43 W.I.R. at 342-43 (citation omitted).
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who takes advantage of it. Appellate procedures that echo down
the years are not compatible with capital punishment. The death
row phenomenon must not become established as a part of our jurisprudence.
The application of the appellants to appeal to the Judicial
Committee of the Privy Council and their petitions to the two human rights bodies do not fall within the category of frivolous procedures disentitling them to ask the Board to look as the whole period of delay in this case. The total period of delay is shocking and
now amounts to almost fourteen years. It is double the time that
the European Court of Human Rights considered would be an infringement of article 3 of the European Convention on Human
Rights and their lordships can have no doubt that an execution
would now be an infringement of section 17(1) of the Jamaican
Constitution.
To execute these men now after holding them in custody in
an agony of suspense for so many years would be inhuman punishment within the meaning of section 17(1). In the last resort the
courts have to accept the responsibility of saying whether the
threshold has been passed in any given case and there may be difficult borderline decisions to be made. This, however, is not a
borderline case. The delay in
this case is wholly unacceptable and
64
this appeal must be allowed.
In the result, Riley was overruled,65 and the court concluded that, "in
any case in which execution is to take place more than five years after sentence there will be strong grounds for believing that the delay is such as to
constitute 'inhuman or degrading punishment or other treatment." ' 66 It was
accordingly recommended that consideration be given to immediate commutation to life imprisonment of the sentences of death of all affected persons
who had then been on death row for more than five years, and a process to
achieve this was in fact put in place and carried out in due course. In coming to its conclusion, the court was not unmindful of "a powerful argument
that it cannot be inhuman or degrading to allow an accused every opportunity
to prolong his life by resort to appellate procedures," and recognized this as
the view then prevailing in some states in the United States, resulting in what
had become known as the "death row phenomenon. ''68 At the end of the day,
the court was in no doubt that developed, contemporary human rights stan64. Id. at 359-60.
65.
66.
67.
68.

Id. at 355.
Id. at 362 (quoting THE JAMAICA (CONsTrruTION) ORDER INCOUNCIL 1962 § 17(1)).
Id.
Pratt[1993] 43 W.I.R. at 356 (internal quotations omitted).
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dards required a departure from its own earlier decision in Riley and Pratt.69
This was therefore a landmark decision, signaling the readiness and willingness of the Privy Council, as the Supreme Court of Jamaica, to mold the law
of that country and the region in response to changing imperatives.
The wholly regrettable sequel to Pratthas, however, been the actions of
the Governments of Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago, both of which subsequently withdrew from the Optional Protocol to the International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights.7 ° It is the Optional Protocol which provides an
"international machinery for dealing with communications from individuals
claiming to be victims of violations" of the rights enshrined in the Covenant. 71 The reason given for the withdrawal was that, in light of the decision
in Pratt, those states would be unable to carry out the death penalty, given
the probability that the domestic appellate and the international process
would not be completed within the five-year period.7 2 The comment of one
learned observer on these developments has, in my view, irresistible force:
Trinidad and Jamaica have now taken a lone stance in the international arena as the only group of countries to withdraw deliberately
from the rule of international human rights law. To impose and
carry-out the death penalty in conditions that would escape international accountability is a clear indication that certain Caribbean
countries are isolating themselves from international principles
concerned with the application of the death penalty. It is hoped
that the states concerned will re-accede to the regional and international human rights bodies, and so enable domestic executive practice to be informed by new73international attitudes to human rights
and fundamental freedoms.
B.

Case Study Two: ProceduralFairnessand the Prerogativeof Mercy

"The phrase 'procedural fairness' has come to describe those rules...
which are concerned with the procedures for administrative decision mak-

69.
70.

See id at 355-62.
Total Abolition in Bulgaria, Canada, Lithuania, DEATH PENALTY NEWS (Amnesty

Int'l, London), Dec. 1998, at 5 [hereinafter DEATH PENALTY NEWS].
71. MORRISON,supra note 42, at 6.

72. See HRW and CEJIL Call on Trinidadand Tobago to Reconsider Withdrawalfrom
the American Convention on Human Rights, HUM. RTS. WATCH, June 2, 1998,
http://hrw.org/english/docs/1998/06/02/trinid1227.htm.
73. Saul Lehrfreund, The Commonwealth Caribbean and Evolving International Attitudes Towards the Death Penalty, in COMMONWEALTH CARIBBEAN HUM. RTS. SEMINAR 75,

87-88 (2000).
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ing. '' 74 The rules "therefore have more to do with ensuring the integrity of
the decision making process, rather than with the decisions themselves. 75
"The core requirements of the concept of procedural fairness in the modern
law are that administrative decision makers must adhere to the rules of natural justice" or, put another way, that "they must act fairly. 7 6 The right to a
hearing has, of course, traditionally been regarded as a key component of the
duty to act fairly.77
Virtually all of the Independence Constitutions in the Commonwealth
Caribbean provide a procedure whereby convicted persons under sentence of
death and who have exhausted all appellate procedures, may nevertheless
seek commutation of their sentences to life imprisonment, by virtue of the
exercise of "the [P]rerogative of [M]ercy. ' '78 The question that arose for
decision for the first time by the Privy Council in de Freitas (a 1975 decision) was whether, "before advice is tendered" by the designated body or
person to the Head of State "as to the exercise of the prerogative of mercy,"
the convicted person is "entitled (1) to be shown the material which the
[body or person] who tender[ed] th[e] advice has placed before the [Head of
State] ...and (2) to be heard by that [Head of State] in reply at a hearing at
which he is legally represented., 79 The Privy Council answered both questions in the negative, Lord Diplock observing memorably that "Mercy is not
80
the subject of legal rights. It begins where legal rights end.,
The decision in de Freitas,which was concerned with the Constitution
of Trinidad and Tobago, 8' was twenty years later followed by the Privy
Council in the case of Reckley v. Minister of Public Safety and Immigration
(No. 2),82 an appeal from the Bahamas.83 Lord Goff, speaking for the Privy
Council, dealt with the matter in this way:
74. MORRISON, supra note 42, at 15 (emphasis added).
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 16.
78. See de Freitas v. Benny [1976] A.C. 239, 247 (P.C.) (appeal taken from Trin. & Tobago). It is so called because its exercise "has always been a matter which lies solely in the
discretion of the sovereign." Id. The person or body on whose advice the Head State acts in
this regard varies from country to country. In Trinidad and Tobago it is a Minister designated
for this purpose. Id. at 248. In Jamaica it is the local Privy Council (not to be confused with
the Judicial Committee). Riley v. A-G [1983] 1 A.C. 719, 725 (P.C.) (appeal taken from
Jam.). In [t]he Bahamas it is the Advisory Committee on the Prerogative of Mercy. See
Reckley v. Minister of Pub. Safety & Immigration (No. 2) [19961 1 A.C. 527, 530 (P.C.)
(appeal taken from Bah.).
79. [1976] A.C. at 247.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 241.
82. [1996] 1 A.C. 527 (P.C.) (appeal taken from Bah.).
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The point can be placed in a broader context. A man accused of a capital offence in [t]he Bahamas has of course his legal
rights. In particular he is entitled to the benefit of a trial before a
judge and jury, with all the rights which that entails. After conviction and sentence, he has a right to appeal to the Court of Appeal
and, if his appeal is unsuccessful, to petition for leave to appeal to
the Privy Council. After his rights of appeal are exhausted, he
may still be able to invoke his fundamental rights under the Constitution. For a man is still entitled to his fundamental rights, and
in particular to his right to the protection of the law, even after he
has been sentenced to death. If therefore it is proposed to execute
him contrary to the law, for example because there has been such
delay that to execute him would constitute inhuman or degrading
punishment, or because there has been a failure to consult the Advisory Committee on the Prerogative of Mercy as required by the
Constitution, then he can apply to the Supreme Court for redress
under article 28 of the Constitution. But the actual exercise by the
designated minister of his discretion in death sentence cases is different. It is concerned with a regime, automatically applicable,
under which the designated minister, having consulted with the
advisory committee, decides, in the exercise of his own personal
discretion, whether to advise the Governor-General that the law
should or should not take its course. Of its very nature the minister's discretion, if exercised in favour of the condemned man, will
involve a departure from the law. Such a decision is taken as an
act of mercy or, as it used to be said, as an act of grace. As Lord
Diplock said in de Freitas v. Benny: "Mercy is not the subject of
legal rights. It begins where legal rights end." And the act of the
advisory committee in advising the minister is of the same charac4
ter as the act of the minister in advising the Governor-General.8
It might have been thought that the confirmation in Reckley that de
Freitas"remains good law," would have put an end to the question whether,
on a petition for mercy (after all other domestic attempts to set aside the convictions or to prevent execution have been exhausted), a convicted person is
entitled to know what material the "Mercy Committee" had before it, and to
make representations as to why mercy should be granted.8 5 But this is precisely the question that the Privy Council was again asked to determine a
mere four years later in an appeal from Jamaica in Lewis v. Attorney-

83.
84.
85.

Id. at 527.
Id. at 540 (citation omitted).
Id. at 542.
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General.86 In that case, there was some discussion of differences in procedure between Trinidad and Tobago, the Bahamas, and Jamaica with regard to
the exercise of the prerogative of mercy, but the majority concluded that
these differences did not justify a distinction in this regard being drawn between the three countries. Lord Slynn observed that "[tihe position in each
with respect to the right to make representations on a mercy petition should
be the same. 8 7 The task at hand and the proper approach were therefore
summarized by Lord Slynn as follows:
Their lordships are accordingly compelled to consider whether
they should follow these two cases. They should do so unless they
are satisfied that the principle laid down was wrong-not least
since the opinion in the Reckley (No 2) case was given as recently
as 1996. The need for legal certainty demands that they should be
very reluctant to depart from recent fully reasoned decisions unless
there are strong grounds to do so. But no less should they be prepared to do so when a man's life is at stake, where the death penalty is involved, if they are satisfied that the earlier cases adopted a
wrong approach. In such
a case rigid adherence to a rule of stare
88
decisis is not justified.
While the Privy Council in Lewis reiterated that "[t]he merits [of a petition
for mercy] are not for the courts to review," it nevertheless observed that
"the insistence of the courts on the observance of the rules of natural justice,
of 'fair play in action', has in recent years been marked" and that, on the face
of the matter:
there are compelling reasons why a body which is required to consider a petition for mercy should be required to receive the representations of a man condemned to die and why he should have an
opportunity in doing so to89see and comment on the other material
which is before that body.
After a full and careful review of authorities throughout the common law
world, as well as of Jamaica's obligations under the American Convention
on Human Rights, the Privy Council concluded in Lewis that de Freitasand
Reckley should be overruled, and that a petitioner for mercy should have
access to the material to be placed before the "Mercy Committee", as well as
86. [2001] 2 A.C. 50 (P.C.) (appeal taken from Jam.).
87. Id. at 74-75.
88. Id. at 75.
89. Id. at 75-76.
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the right to make representations to the Committee, whether in writing, (as
would normally be the case) or orally. 90 The Privy Council was obviously
influenced by the dictum of Justice Holmes in Biddle v. Perovich,91 that "[a]
pardon in our days is not a private act of grace from an individual happening
to possess power. It is a part of the Constitutional scheme., 92 In that case,
the consideration of whether it should be granted or not must necessarily be
open to judicial review in order to determine that the ordinary accepted principles of fairness have been applied.93 "This decision, as I have observed
elsewhere, 'is accordingly not so much a 'death penalty' case as it is a case
about the duty to demonstrate fairness in process, enhanced, albeit, by the
finality of the consequences of failing to do so."'94 It is at the same time
another demonstration of the willingness of the Privy Council, as a court of
last resort, to insist that old paradigms (mercy begins where legal rights end)
be subject to fresh scrutiny in the light of developed concepts of what the
requirements of fairness might demand in particular cases.95
C.

Case Study Three: The Mandatory Death Penalty

As recently as 1981, Lord Diplock in delivering the judgment of the
Privy Council in Ong Ah Chuan v. Public Prosecutor96 had observed that
there was nothing unconstitutional in a death sentence being mandatory and
that its efficacy as a deterrent might to some extent be diminished if it were
not.97 Furthermore, it had not been sought in either Prattor Lewis, or in any
of the earlier challenges to the manner of the administration of the death penalty, to argue that the mandatory nature of the penalty was in any way unconstitutional. 98 Yet, by 2004, Lord Hope tersely described Lord Diplock's remark referred to above as "no longer acceptable." 99 What is it that had happened in the interim?

90. See id. at 279-80.
91. 274 U.S. 480 (1927).
92. Id. at 486.
93. See id.
94. MORRISON,supra note 42, at 19 (citation omitted).
95. See generally Biddle, 274 U.S. 480.
96. [1981] A.C. 648 (P.C.) (appeal taken from Sing.).
97. Id. at 674.
98. See Pratt v. A-G [1993] 43 W.I.R. 340, [1994] 2 A.C. 1 (P.C.) (appeal taken from
Jam.); Lewis v. A-G [2001] 2 A.C. 50 (P.C.) (appeal taken from Jam.).
99. Watson v. The Queen [2004] UKPC 34 29, [2005] 1 A.C. 472 (appeal taken from
Jam.).
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In Reyes v. The Queen,1°° the defendant was convicted of a "class A"
murder which by the Criminal Code of Belize was punishable by a mandatory sentence of death. 10 ' The defendant challenged his sentence as unconstitutional in that it infringed upon his right not to be subjected to inhuman or
degrading punishment or other treatment, under Section 7 of the Belize Constitution. 10 2 In another landmark ruling, the Privy Council upheld this contention and set aside his sentence, holding that since the character of the offence of murder by shooting could vary widely, the imposition of the death
penalty for some such offences "would be plainly excessive and disproportionate."' 103 Denying a person convicted of murder by shooting "the opportunity, before sentence is passed, to seek to persuade the court that in all the
circumstances to condemn him to death would be disproportionate and inappropriate is to treat him as no human being should be treated and thus to
deny his basic humanity." 1 4 The sentence of death was therefore quashed
and the case remitted to the Supreme Court of Belize to pass an appropriate
sentence
after receiving or hearing any evidence and submissions on his be10 5
half.
In arriving at this conclusion, the Privy Council referred with approval
to the report of an independent enquiry into the mandatory life sentence for
murder, which it obtained in the United Kingdom, in which it was stated that
"'[t]here is probably no offence in the criminal calendar that varies so widely
both in character and in degree of moral guilt as that which falls within the
legal definition of murder." ' 1 6 Reference was also made to "[i]nternational
developments,"1 07 some of which have already been described at paragraphs
eight through ten above, as well as to the modem approach to the interpretation of constitutional provisions protecting human rights, which is to adopt a
"generous and purposive interpretation" and to consider the substance of the
fundamental right at issue and "ensure contemporary protection of that right
in the light of 'evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a
maturing society.,, 10 8 Against this broad backdrop of principle, the court
had no difficulty in holding that the mandatory sentence of death for murder,
without reference to any potentially mitigating factor in the person or in cir100. [2002] UKPC 11, [20021 2 A.C. 235 (appeal taken from Belize).
101. Reyes [2002] 2 A.C. at 235, 238-39.
102. Id. at 237.
103. Id. at 242, 256.
104. Id. at 256.
105. Id. at 258.
106. Reyes [2002] 2 A.C. at 242 (quoting REPORT OF THE COMMrrTEE ON THE PENALTY
HOMICIDE 21 (Prison Reform Trust 1993)).
107. Id. at 244.
108. Id. at 246 (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958)).
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cumstances of the condemned man, constituted inhuman and degrading punishment." 9
To similar effect as Reyes were the decisions of the Privy Council in
0 and Fox v. The Queen."'1 And
Regina v. Hughes"1
more recently, in Watson
2
v. The Queen,1 the Privy Council came to the same conclusion, Lord Hope
referring specifically to "[tlhe march of international jurisprudence" on the
death penalty issue which had driven the court to the conclusion that the
mandatory sentence of death was unconstitutional." 3 In this regard, two
American cases, Woodson v. North Carolina"l4 and Roberts v. Louisiana,"15
influenced the thinking of the Privy Council, in particular around the notions
that "[c]onsideration of both the offender and the offense in order to arrive at
a just and appropriate sentence has been viewed as a progressive and humanizing development', 1 6 and that "it is essential that the capital-sentencing decision allow for consideration of whatever mitigating circumstances
' 17 may be
offense."
particular
the
or
offender
particular
the
either
to
relevant
In the companion cases to Watson from Barbados and Trinidad and Tobago, it is clear that the decisions would have been the same were it not for
the existence, in the constitutions of those countries, of effective provisions
saving laws that pre-dated the constitution ("pre-existing laws") from challenge. 118 Ultimately, in Matthew v. The State, 19 the breathtaking progression
that Reyes, Watson and the other cases have described receives its most effective summary from the brief, but powerful, dissent of Lord Nicholls:
Years ago no one thought mandatory death sentences were
an unusual or inhumane form of punishment. They existed in the
United Kingdom until 1965. As recently as 1981 Lord Diplock
was able to say there was nothing unusual in a capital sentence being mandatory.
Times have changed. Human rights values set higher standards today. The common endeavour, to rid the world of man's
109. Id. at 248-50.
110. [2002] UKPC 12, [2002] 2 A.C. 259 (appeal taken from St. Lucia).
111. [2002] UKPC 13, [2002] 2 A.C. 284 (appeal taken from St. Christopher & Nevis).
112. [2004] UKPC 34, [2005] 1 A.C. 472 (appeal taken from Jam.).
113. Watson [2004] UKPC 34 30.
114. 428 U.S. 280 (1976).
115. 431 U.S. 633 (1977).
116. Woodson, 428 U.S. at 304.
117. Roberts, 431 U.S. at 637.
118. See Boyce v. The Queen [2004] UKPC 32, [2005] 1 A.C. 400 (appeal taken from
Barb.); Matthew v. The State [2004] UKPC 33, [20051 1 A.C. 433 (appeal taken from Trin. &
Tobago).
119. [2004] UKPC 33, [2005] 1 A.C. 433 (appeal taken from Trin. & Tobago).
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inhumanity to man, has not ceased. Conduct, once tolerated, is no
longer acceptable. Murder can be committed in all manner of circumstances. In some the death penalty will plainly be excessive
and disproportionate. As Lord Lane noted, there is "probably no
offence in the criminal calendar that varies so widely both in character and in degree of moral guilt as that which falls within the legal definition of murder." To condemn every person convicted of
murder to death regardless of the circumstances is a form of inhumane punishment. A sentence of death which lacks proportionality lacks humanity.
The three countries with which these appeals are concerned
have human rights values at the very forefront of their constitutions. Among the fundamental human rights expressly enshrined
is prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment in section 5 of the
Constitution of Trinidad and Tobago, inhuman punishment in section 17 of the Constitution of Jamaica, and inhuman punishment in
section 15 of the Constitution of Barbados. Each country has also
entered into international commitments of a like nature.
Despite these constitutional and international guarantees the
governments of these countries insist on continuing to inflict on
their citizens a form of punishment which, by today's standards, is
inhuman. Each government justifies its mandatory sentences of
death for murder by pointing to a transitional savings clause in the
country's constitution in respect of laws in force when the constitution was adopted. Each government seeks thereby to clothe a
form of inhuman punishment with continuing constitutional legitimacy and an appearance of human rights respectability.
I do not believe the framers of these constitutions ever intended the existing laws savings provisions should operate to deprive the country's citizens of the protection afforded by rising
standards set by human rights values. The savings clauses were
intended to smooth the transition, not to freeze standards for ever.
The constitutions of these countries should be interpreted accordingly, by giving proper effect to their spirit and not being mesmerised by their letter. A literal interpretation of these constitutions
means that the law of Jamaica, a country which has taken steps to
distinguish between different types of murders, is held to be unconstitutional, whereas the laws of Barbados and of Trinidad and
Tobago, where no ameliorating steps have been taken, are held to
be constitutional. This is bizarre.
Self-evidently, an interpretation of the constitutions which
produces this outcome is unacceptable. A supreme court of a
country which adopts such a literal approach is failing in its responsibilities to the citizens of the country. A constitution should
be interpreted as an evolving statement of a country's supreme
law.
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This is not to substitute the personal [predilections] of individual judges for the chosen language of the constitution. Rather,
it is a recognition that the values underlying a constitution should
be given due weight when the constitution [fails] to be interpreted
in changed conditions. A supreme court which fails to do this is
not fulfilling its proper role as guardian of the constitution. It is
abdicating its responsibility to ensure that the people of a country,
including those least able to protect themselves, have the full
measure of protection
against the executive which a constitution
120
exists to provide.
The result of the decisions in Reyes and Watson is that the sentencing
process, once perfunctory in capital murder cases, must now take on an importance second only to that of the trial itself, in the quest for proportionality
and individualized sentences. This will pose a particular challenge for practitioners at the criminal bar in the affected parts of the region, as they seek to
assist the judges "to develop' 2judicially
reasoned alternatives to death in con1
victions for capital murder."'
VI.

CONCLUSION

These three case studies demonstrate the response of the Privy Council to the challenge of change in the area of human rights norms in the context of death penalty cases. They underscore the fact that for the law to preserve its relevance in this area it must be constantly responsive to the "evolv' 22
ing standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society."'
While this conclusion applies equally in relation to private law, its importance has an enhanced significance in relation to constitutions, which articulate and record the covenant between the state and its citizens and which
must of necessity be capable of adaptation to changing circumstances. In
this regard, the role of the judiciary, and in particular courts of last resort,
attains the critical significance so well captured by Justice Dickson in the
Supreme Court of Canada in Hunter v. Southam, Inc.:1

120.

Matthew [20041 UKPC 33 in 65-71 (citations omitted) (quoting REPORT OF THE

COMMITTEE ON THE PENALTY FOR HOMICIDE 21 (Prison Reform Trust 1993)).

121. See Nicholas Blake, The Decision of Lambert Watson in Context: What it Means for
Jamaica and the Caribbean (Sept. 13, 2004, Seminar on Sentencing for Murder in Jamaica).
122. Reyes v. The Queen [2002] UKPC 11, [2002] 2 A.C. 235, 246 (appeal taken from
Belize) (quoting Trop v Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958)).
123. [1984] 2 S.C.R. 145 (Can.).
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The task of expounding a constitution is crucially different from
that of construing a statute. A statute defines present rights and
obligations. It is easily enacted and as easily repealed. A constitution, by contrast, is drafted with an eye to the future. Its function
is to provide a continuing framework for the legitimate exercise of
governmental power and, when joined by a Bill or a Charter of
Rights, for the unremitting protection of individual rights and liberties. Once enacted, its provisions cannot easily be repealed or
amended. It must, therefore, be capable of growth and development over time to meet new social, political and historical realities
often unimagined by its framers. The judiciary is the guardian of
the constitution and must,
in interpreting its provisions, bear these
124
considerations in mind.
The Caribbean Court of Justice was conceived and has been established
with the highest of expectations, reflecting the confidence of the governments of the region in the ability of local institutions to secure for the future,
the quality of adjudication that every citizen is entitled to expect. In discharging their duties, the new judges of that new court will do well to remember always, as the Privy Council has manifestly demonstrated that it has
in recent years, their role as independent guardians of the constitution, particularly so in changing times.

124.

Id. at 155 (emphasis in original).
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